INTRODUCTION
The Fabian strategy, also known as strategic defense, is a military strategy in which a weaker force avoids decisive battles with the enemy and creates delay in a war of attrition until the right moment arrives to deliver a decisive blow. General George Washington and his Continental Army, supplemented by the militia, employed this strategy successfully against the British Army during the War for American Independence. The Russian generals did not, however, employ a successful strategic defense against Japanese expeditionary forces in the Russo-Japanese War. To understand why, this paper considers the elements of the Fabian strategy and compares how those elements were satisfied, or not, by General Washington and the
Russian generals.
A salient difference is the fact that General Washington was fighting from patriot soil on which he enjoyed good intelligence, close relations with the Continental Congress, moral support in a war for survival, and adequate sanctuary while he awaited opportunities to strike against outposts and other detachments of the British main force. Russian Generals Stessel and Kuropatkin, on the other hand, were fighting an unpopular limited war on distant foreign soil and were therefore deprived of sanctuary, good intelligence and moral support. Their delaying tactics were less hit-and-run attacks conducted on their own terms and more defend-and-retreat encounters against large, persistent and highly-motivated Japanese forces.
ELEMENTS OF THE FABIAN STRATEGY
The Fabian strategy is named after Quintus Fabius Maximus Verrucosus. War, 195. 5 Ibid., 12 (for General Washington, "the preservation of his army was a higher object.").
coordination; (5) light, mobile forces; and (6) a final, devastating blow. It should be added that essential elements include the luxury of good intelligence to keep track of the location and strength of enemy forces and the luxury of time to wait for the appropriate moments to strike.
There are also political obstacles to overcome. While incremental successes increase morale, the use of a defensive strategy can be politically unpopular because it involves continual retreat against weaker elements of the main force, which can be perceived as cowardly. In addition, there is less luxury of time in democratic societies. Public support of war is crucial in a democratic society, and voters do not have the patience needed for a prolonged war. Civilians will naturally have more patience when their army is fighting a war of survival than they will during a limited war that is being fought abroad against an enemy that poses no apparent threat to national security.
As discussed below, General Washington satisfied all of the essential elements of a Fabian strategy and withstood political obstacles. The Russian generals, on the other hand, did neither.
THE FABIAN STRATEGY USED BY GENERAL WASHINGTON
After a devastating defeat at the Battle of Long Island (1776), and after his "war of posts" proved to be equally unsuccessful, General Washington and his council of generals finally realized that they needed to avoid direct confrontations with the main British army. 6 Unlike
Washington's war of posts, the aim of the strategic defense "was to defend not any geographic area or point but the existence of his army." 7 As a Colonial officer, Washington had seen Indian warfare, so he understood that the same style of fighting could be applied against the British Army's traditional battle style. Russia needed reinforcements from western Russia to suppress the Japanese forces. This meant a journey of about 7500 miles along the Trans-Siberian Railroad, which required a month to complete under favorable conditions. The railway was the dominant line of communication to eastern Russia, but it was only a single track, which required the time-consuming procedure of using sidings along the way, and a slow ferry was required to cross Lake Baikal. The Japanese timed their attack at the time of year when it was most difficult to cross the lake due to ice. The transit of Russian troops and materiel by sea was even slower, requiring the Baltic Fleet to conduct a seven-month journey of approximately 18,000 miles.
The Russian military was therefore forced to adopt a strategic defense until troops and materiel could be transferred from western Russia. As Fuller notes, Kuropatkin's plan was to buy time for the deployment of additional Russian troops by using "holding actions and strategic 9 Fuller calls Kuropatkin's strategy "alternating tenacious holding actions and strategic withdrawals" and does not refer to Fabius. William C. Fuller, Jr., Strategy and Power in Russia, 1600 -1914 (New York: The Free Press, 1992 , 400. withdrawals . . . to deny Tokyo an early victory."
10 Kuropatkin described a classic Fabian strategy in his stated intent to "avoid decisive engagements in order to escape being defeated in detail prior to the concentration of forces sufficient for the defeat of the Japanese." 11 Fuller, Strategy and Power in Russia, 400 (quoting Russko-iaponskaia voina 1904-05 gg. 1 (St. Petersburg, 1910), 192 
CONCLUSION
History has shown that the strategic defense is effective under the right conditions. When effective, historians credit it with the descriptor "Fabian." Historians therefore include General
Washington among generals who have employed the Fabian strategy, alongside French General
Bertrand du Guesclin and the illustrious American Sam Houston. They do not include General Kuropatkin or General Stessel. Among many arguable factors, General Washington was successful mostly because he was fighting a war of survival from his homeland. Because of this, his troops were highly motivated, intelligence and communications were good, and there were places of sanctuary. Given these basic ingredients, it also helped that Washington was a capable field commander and that his troops were light and mobile.
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